Tuesday, August 7, 2007

Clinton Proposes Lender Rules, Prepayment Penalty Ban


Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton proposed new requirements for lenders and an end to prepayment penalties for home mortgages as part of a plan to combat a growing number of defaults in the U.S.

``We need to act now with smart, practical solutions,'' Clinton said today during a campaign stop in Derry, New Hampshire. ``We need to put an end to fly-by-night mortgage brokers peddling loans to unqualified applicants based on inflated appraisals.''

The number of mortgages entering foreclosure in the U.S. reached a record in the first quarter as defaults spread from ``subprime'' borrowers with bad credit to people with reliable records. Clinton, a New York senator, spoke a day after American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. filed for bankruptcy, becoming the second-biggest residential lender in the U.S. to do so this year.

Clinton, 59, said she will introduce legislation in September that would ban penalties for people who pay off their mortgages ahead of time and require federal registration of mortgage brokers and greater disclosure of their fees. She would also set up a $1 billion fund for state programs that help borrowers avoid foreclosure and urge Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which operate under a federal charter, to do more on the issue.

Thursday, August 2, 2007

Moody’s To Revise Alt-A RMBS Rating Methodology

From Housing wire.com

Moody’s Investors Service said late yesterday that it will revise its ratings criteria for Alt-A RMBS, reflecting what it called “collateral weaknesses that have surfaced in Alt-A pools securitized in 2006.” To put this into perspective: similar revisions in the ratings criteria for subprime securities — which many critics say came too late in the cycle — forced massive downgrades of subprime RMBS, driving some pretty significant losses for investors.

Per the press release:

These changes, which are effective August 1, 2007, address the poor performance of subprime-like loans, low and no equity loans, and low and no documentation loans present in certain Alt-A transactions. In aggregate, our increase in loss estimates is projected to range from an increase of 10% for stronger Alt-A pools to an increase of more than 100% for weaker Alt-A pools. For example, our loss projection for a strong Alt-A pool may increase from 0.50% to 0.55%, whereas our loss projection for a weak Alt-A pool may increase from 1.5% to 3.00%.

It’s interesting to note that Moody’s is referring to Alt-A loans as “subprime-like,” a characterization many Alt-A lenders including IndyMac Bank have contested. But it appears Moody’s has its reasons:

“Actual performance of weaker Alt-A loans has in many cases been comparable to stronger subprime performance, signaling that underwriting standards were likely closer to subprime guidelines,” says Moody’s Senior Credit Officer, Marjan Riggi. “Absent strong compensating factors, we will model these loans as subprime loans.”

Those are pretty strong words, and the fact that Moody’s will now look to model at least some Alt-A loans as if they were subprime suggests that a good number of Alt-A downgrades may be just over the horizon.

Friday, July 6, 2007

Bad Pennies and Title Agents

Bad Title Agents are like bad pennies - they keep coming back.

If you’ve been in the title business long enough, you’ve heard the story: A Title Agent bends the rules, overcharges clients, skims money, or participates in fraud (multiple choice, pick all that apply). Their underwriter discovers a problem, scratches the surface and decides that they want no more of the relationship. The relationship is cancelled.

Game over for the agent? Not even. No charges are filed, no licenses are revoked, and the bad penny Agent stays in business. In many cases, it doesn’t even slow them down.

The Agent may only lose one of several underwriters. Underwriters talk, but they don’t always share. Concerned about litigation, they leave their peers to their own discovery. There’s no clearing house of agent information and no one is keeping score. The other underwriters may not even suspect there’s a problem with the agent.

Occasionally another underwriter comes rushing in, knowing of the problem, but deliberately overlooking it. The bad penny still has a license and a book of business. If you have the tolerance for risk, why not, there’s money to be made.

And there are underwriters who just don’t want to know – don’t ask, don’t tell. If you don’t go looking for it, you can’t find it. The premiums keep flowing.

The details don’t really matter, the result is the same - an entire industry starts to look sleazy.

The title industry needs to weed out the bad pennies and do it now. There’s been talk about standards (Source of Title, Title-opoly), but standards are empty words unless someone enforces them. There are those in the industry who have problems with following the rules, let alone moving to the higher plane of standards. Let’s clean that up first.

Agents and those who care about industry need to take a stand:

Support those who support the industry. Let the underwriters know that looking the other way isn’t acceptable anymore. The bad pennies hurt the consumer and hurt the industry. If your underwriter doesn’t seem interested, vote with your feet – find an underwriter who is interested in protecting the industry.

Lobby legislators and regulators personally and through our professional organizations to:

End the Secrets. Allow the underwriters to share information about cancellations for cause without fear of litigation.

Get the Bad Pennies out of our Business. Revoke the licenses of those involved in misdeeds. Forever.

Keep them out of Real Estate. Change or modify the governing laws so that those found guilty of misdeeds cannot practice law, or hold licenses for mortgage, real estate or appraisal. Otherwise, like cockroaches, they will scurry to a dark corner of the industry and continue business as usual.

Prosecute. Insist that those that violate the law be turned over to the authorities and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

We need to clean up the industry and do it now before someone else comes in and decides to clean it up for us. We won’t like it.


From:http://clearingtitle.wordpress.com/

Friday, June 29, 2007

S&P, Moody's Hide Rising Risk on $200 Billion of Mortgage Bonds

June 29 (Bloomberg) -- Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings are masking burgeoning losses in the market for subprime mortgage bonds by failing to cut the credit ratings on about $200 billion of securities backed by home loans.

The highest default rates on home loans in a decade have reduced prices of some bonds backed by mortgages to people with poor or limited credit by more than 50 cents on the dollar and forced New York-based Bear Stearns Cos. to offer $3.2 billion to bail out a money-losing hedge fund. Almost 65 percent of the bonds in indexes that track subprime mortgage debt don't meet the ratings criteria in place when they were sold, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

That may just be the beginning. Downgrades by S&P, Moody's and Fitch would force hundreds of investors to sell holdings, roiling the $800 billion market for securities backed by subprime mortgages and $1 trillion of collateralized debt obligations, the fastest growing part of the financial markets.

``You'll see massive losses from banks, insurance companies and pension managers,'' said Joshua Rosner, a managing director at investment research firm Graham Fisher & Co. in New York and co-author of a study last month that said S&P, Moody's and Fitch understate the risks of subprime mortgage bonds. ``The longer they wait, the worse it's going to be.''

Loss Estimates

Rosner estimates that collateralized debt obligations, which have packaged thousands of bonds and derivatives into new securities, will lose $125 billion. Institutional Risk Analytics, a Hawthorne, California-based company that writes computer programs for the four biggest accounting firms, says 25 percent of the face value of CDOs is in jeopardy, or $250 billion.

Losses may rival the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. The Resolution Trust Corp., formed by the U.S. government to resolve the thrift crisis, sold $452 billion of assets at a cost to taxpayers of about $140 billion.

The current debacle threatens the growth of asset-backed bonds, securities that use consumer, commercial and other loans and receivables as collateral. That market, which includes mortgage securities, has doubled to about $10 trillion since 2000, according to the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association, a New York-based trade group.

Executives at New York-based S&P, Moody's and Fitch say they are waiting until foreclosure sales show that the collateral backing the bonds has declined enough to create losses before lowering ratings on some of the $6.65 trillion in outstanding mortgage-backed debt.

`Knee-Jerk Responses'

Homeowners may be delinquent on mortgage payments for at least three months before foreclosure proceedings begin, and the process can be delayed if a borrower files for bankruptcy or fights eviction. Even when lenders repossess a home, the value of the mortgage isn't written down until the house is sold. Bondholders only see a loss if the price of a house is lower than the loan used as collateral for debt securities.

``We're taking action as we see it,'' said Brian Clarkson, Moody's global head of the structured products in New York. ``We're not doing knee-jerk responses.''

Ratings companies are postponing the inevitable and are dumping securities as defaults by subprime borrowers increase, investors say.

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the biggest underwriter of mortgage bonds, sold $2.43 billion of Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust bonds a year ago. An $18 million portion of the bonds rated BBB- fell to 43 cents on the dollar from 98 cents in January, according to prices compiled by New York-based Merrill Lynch & Co.

Increased Delinquencies

More than 15 percent of the mortgages in the securities are at least 60 days delinquent and another 8 percent are in foreclosure, according to the bond trustee. Moody's and S&P say they are considering downgrading the debt.

A total of 11 percent of the loan collateral for all subprime mortgage bonds had payments at least 90 days late, were in foreclosure or had the underlying property seized, according to a June 1 report by Friedman, Billings, Ramsey Group Inc., a securities firm in Arlington, Virginia. In May 2005, that amount was 5.4 percent.

The increase in delinquencies means CDO investors, who sometimes use borrowed money to magnify their bets, may be holding securities that are riskier than their ratings indicate, said Bill Gross, chief investment officer at Pacific Investment Management Co., based in Newport Beach, California.

``The Petri dish turns from a benign experiment in financial engineering to a destructive virus,'' Gross, who oversees the world's biggest bond fund, said this week in a commentary on the firm's Web site. The companies gave the mortgage bonds investment-grade ratings, duped by the ``six-inch hooker heels'' of collateral that can't be trusted, he said.

No Disclosure

CDOs aren't required to disclose the contents of their holdings to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and most can change them after the bonds are sold.

Losses reflect the decline of the U.S. housing market, where the national median home sale price is poised for its first annual drop since the Great Depression, according to the National Association of Realtors.

Investors are responding by retreating from all sorts of riskier assets, threatening to reduce credit. Companies canceled at least $3 billion of bond sales worldwide in the past two weeks. U.S. Treasury notes snapped a six-week losing streak last week, pushing yields down from the highest in five years, as investors sought the haven of government bonds.

The subprime meltdown is sending shock waves through the capital markets in part because mortgage bonds are the world's biggest debt market, according to the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association.

Thousands of Investors

Thousands of investors own mortgage bonds, ranging from fund managers such as Pimco, a unit of Munich-based Allianz SE, to the California Public Employees' Retirement System, the biggest U.S. public pension fund, and foreign banks like Fortis SA in Brussels.

CDOs are created by taking bonds, loans and other securities, pooling them together and chopping them into new securities with ratings ranging from the safest AAA to ones so risky they have no rankings. Investors snapped up $500 million of the securities globally last year because they typically yield more than bonds with the same credit ratings. Sales of CDOs have risen five-fold since 2001, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.

One reason for the higher yields on some CDOs is that subprime-related debt made up about 45 percent of the collateral backing the $375 billion of CDOs sold in the U.S. in 2006, data compiled by Moody's and New York-based Morgan Stanley show.

Drexel Creation

Credit Suisse Group, based in Zurich, created a $1 billion CDO called Class V Funding III Ltd. in February by combining the A rated portions of 91 other CDOs that invest in debt backed by consumer obligations.

The biggest portion, or $859.2 million of bonds, is rated AAA and pays interest as low as 5.70 percent. The smallest piece, or $2.5 million, is ranked BBB and has a coupon of 10.61 percent, according to a May 22 report produced by the trustee for the CDO.

At the time of the report, AAA rated corporate bonds had an average yield of 5.45 percent, while BBB debt yielded 6.03 percent, according to Merrill Lynch index data.

Demand for CDOs, first used in 1987 by bankers at now- defunct Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., is drying up as mortgage bond losses spread. Planned sales of CDOs that rely on high- rated asset-backed debt dropped to $3 billion this month from $20 billion in May, according to analysts at JPMorgan, the third-largest U.S. bank.

First Year Rankings

``A lot of these should be downgraded sooner rather than later,'' said Jeff Given at John Hancock Advisors LLC in Boston, who oversees $3.5 billion of mortgage bonds. The ratings companies may be embarrassed to downgrade the bonds, he said. ``It's easier to say two years from now that you were wrong on a rating than it is to say you were wrong five months after you rated it.''

Fitch is ``deliberate'' in its actions, John Bonfiglio, the firm's head of U.S. structured finance ratings, said in an interview in his New York office. Fitch is a unit of Paris-based Fimalac AS. ``I would not say we were slow.''

The ratings companies point out they have downgraded bonds less than a year after they were sold, the first time that has ever happened. S&P has lowered a total of 15 subprime bonds sold in 2005, or 0.31 percent of the total, and 32 sold in 2006, or 0.68 percent.

``People are surprised there haven't been more downgrades,'' Claire Robinson, a managing director at Moody's, said during an investor conference sponsored by the firm in New York on June 5. ``What they don't understand about the rating process is that we don't change our ratings on speculation about what's going to happen.''

Bear Stearns Jolt

Accurate rankings for mortgage bonds and CDOs become even more important because the securities rarely trade, so investors can't immediately value their holdings when market conditions change. Instead, they often rely on sales of similar securities or computer models that use ratings and past performance of the underlying collateral to come up with a value.

CDO investors were jolted this month by the losses in the Bear Stearns hedge funds.

The funds, called High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund and High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, had borrowed $10 billion from securities firms and banks to make bets on CDOs, mortgage bonds and other securities. As the values of the holdings declined, creditors seized some of the collateral pledged for the loans and sold them through auctions.

Fire Sale

A concern was that a forced sale would slash prices on CDOs, providing new, lower benchmarks that investors would have to use to value their holdings, resulting in billions of dollars of losses.
``We remain nervous about the end of the week, when many leveraged investors in the CDO markets will have to mark down their positions,'' debt strategists at Barclays Capital in New York said in a June 28 report. ``The worry is that this will be large enough to trigger margin calls which, in turn, will cause other liquidations and so on.''

Merrill Lynch threatened to take and sell $850 million of bonds held as collateral for loans it had made to the funds. Lehman, JPMorgan and Cantor Fitzgerald LP, all based in New York, also pulled out.

Bear Stearns avoided an even worse fallout by offering to provide one of the funds with loans. The original $3.2 billion provision was reduced to $1.6 billion after the firm sold securities and lenders took some of the collateral.

UBS, Queen's Walk

Other hedge funds are closing down or reporting losses because of subprime losses. Zurich-based UBS AG shuttered a hedge fund unit that saddled the biggest money manager for wealthy investors with 150 million Swiss francs ($122 million) of first-quarter losses.

Queen's Walk Investment Ltd., a London-based fund, reported a loss of 67.7 million euros ($91.2 million) last week for the year ended March 31. Cambridge Place Investment Management LLP, another London money manager, said yesterday that it will close Caliber Global Investment Ltd., a fund that had $908 million of assets in March.

A sweeping downgrade of bonds would lead to sales of assets by investors, banks and pension funds who operate under rules that would cause them to adjust their portfolios to reflect the new ratings. S&P, Moody's and Fitch have restricted their ratings changes on BBB- rated mortgage bonds to 1.3 percent of those outstanding, according to Credit Suisse analyst Rod Dubitsky in New York. About 80 percent of the remainder will eventually have their ratings reduced, he said.

Abandoned Criteria

``We're talking about massive, massive downgrades here,'' Dubitsky, the No. 2 asset-backed real estate debt analyst in last year's Institutional Investor magazine poll of researchers, said in a telephone interview.

S&P abandoned seven-year-old criteria for determining a bond's protection against default in February.

Under the old guidelines, S&P said a bond's ``credit support'' must be twice the rolling 90-day average of the sum of value of mortgages delinquent by three months or in foreclosure plus real estate that has been seized by the lender.

Credit support for a bond is determined by looking at the number of lower-rated securities that would have to go bust before it suffered losses, the dollar amount of mortgages available to pay back the interest and the annualized interest the mortgages generate in excess of what needs to be paid to bondholders.

The measure was one of four tests used by S&P, said Chris Atkins, a spokesman for the company, a unit of New York-based McGraw-Hill Cos. A failure to meet the credit support standard wouldn't have automatically resulted in a downgrade, he said.

$200 Billion

Of the 300 bonds in ABX indexes, the benchmarks for the subprime mortgage debt market, 190 fail to meet the credit support standard, according to data released in May by trustees responsible for funneling interest payments to debt investors.

Most of those, representing about $200 billion, are rated below AAA. Some contain so many defaulted loans that the credit support is outweighed by potential losses. Fifty of the 60 A rated bonds fail the criteria, as do 22 of the 60 AA rated bonds and three of the 60 AAA bonds.

All but five of 120 securities in BBB or BBB- rated portions of the mortgage-backed securities would have failed S&P's criteria, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

None have been downgraded, though S&P and Moody's have parts of three pools of securities linked to the index under review for a downgrade. Fitch has downgraded parts of three mortgage pools tied to the ABX and put four on watch for downgrade.

`Warrant Our Attention'

``Don't misunderstand me: I'm not saying these others are performing great,'' Robert Pollsen, a director in S&P's residential mortgage surveillance in New York, said in an interview last month. ``And they certainly might warrant our attention several months from now, which obviously we're going to do.''

Some investors say the ratings companies are waiting too long before downgrading the mortgage bonds and the CDOs that contain them. They noted that S&P and Moody's maintained their investment-grade ranking on Enron Corp. until days before the Houston-based energy trader filed for bankruptcy.

``That's like saying these trees are just fine as there's a forest fire on the other side of the hill,'' said James Melcher, president of money-management firm Balestra Capital Ltd. in New York, who runs a $105 million hedge fund.

Monday, June 25, 2007

From the WSJ Online Journal

REAL TIME
By JASON FRY

When Public Records Are Too Public
Open Records Are an Established Tradition,But Does Internet Access Call for a Change?
June 25, 2007

The Web wasn't created to appeal to our sense of voyeurism. It just feels that way sometimes.
I'm not talking about dirty pictures, but the ability the Web's given all of us to snoop on our friends, colleagues and neighbors, from Googling the new guy in the next cube to finding out what the people next door paid for their house to seeing which neighbors have given money to which candidates and parties.

Such behavior runs the gamut from generally acceptable nosiness (we're a nation of self-Googlers, after all) to mildly gauche (in New York City discussing what apartments cost is practically a sport) to creepy (keep your nose out of my politics). As with all questions about Internet privacy and personal information, there are generational differences at work -- if you came of age blogging and being Googled, someone seeing you gave $100 to MoveOn.org might not be the biggest deal. (I wrote about different generations' attitudes toward personal information online earlier this month.)

But then there's another set of personal details that have made their way online, and these documents are much more worrisome. Property deeds, marriage and divorce records, court files, motor-vehicle information and tax documents are increasingly being digitized, and contain a wealth of information that few of us would want online: Social Security numbers, birth dates, maiden names and images of our signatures. Local governments have rushed to put those documents online for a decade or so, often without scrubbing them of such information. And that's made them potentially fertile ground for busybodies, stalkers and identity thieves.

Betty "BJ" Ostergren, a 58-year-old from outside Richmond, Va., has made it her mission to alert people to the dangers of public records online. Ms. Ostergren is feisty bordering on ferocious: Her tactics include mailing letters to people alerting them that their personal information is online and posting copies of public documents (or links to them) displaying the personal information of circuit-court clerks and other politicians, including former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay and Florida Gov. Jeb Bush. (See her Web site, the Virginia Watchdog, here; this Washington Post profile of her is also a good read.)

Long a local activist, Ms. Ostergren began her crusade in the summer of 2002, when a title examiner called to tell her that public records from her home county of Hanover would be put online within a few weeks. Ms. Ostergren says she objected to the fact that her signature would be online -- not to mention other people's Social Security numbers. She confronted her county's circuit-court clerk and began a telephone campaign.

"People were livid," she says, adding with satisfaction: "Our records in this county did not go online." Since then, her campaign has grown to include the entire U.S. -- Ms. Ostergren moves easily from a discussion of Franklin County, Ohio's decision to remove images of mortgage records to what she sees as Florida's lack of progress and Maricopa County, Ariz.'s troubles.
An important note: The records being put online are public, and available – sensitive information and all -- to anyone who goes down to the courthouse or county seat. And many of them have already been compiled and digitized by data warehouses, who often make them available to marketers and real-estate professionals. Open records are a longstanding American tradition; so too is a hold-your-nose acceptance that commercial entities will try to make a profit by exploiting that openness.

But at the same time, it's too simplistic to say that just because records are available by going to a government building and talking to a clerk, we shouldn't worry that they're now available through some Web sleuthing. Sometimes a difference of degree is so significant that it may as well be a difference of kind: Foes of the recording industry rightly note that people have always stolen music by taping it for their friends, but it's risible to compare the potential effect of running off some cassette copies of an album to that of making a digital copy of that album available for the taking online.

Similarly, it takes a pretty determined busybody or thief to visit the courthouse, and the law has acknowledged this, noting the "practical obscurity" of such records. The Web may not change the status of public records, but it means the end of practical obscurity, enabling drive-by voyeurism for the bored or petty – or identity thieves in the cybercafes of, say, Nigeria or Romania.

How did Social Security numbers and other sensitive information wind up online? Blame a collision between our enthusiasm for technology and our failure to appreciate its consequences. In the last decade, states and local governments rushed to put documents online, eager to appear progressive and make government more efficient. But the momentum of that effort got ahead of our ability to sort out what might happen. In particular, we underestimated the borderline-spooky power of search to find needles in technological haystacks.

Now, the job is to clean up the mess. And there does seem to be progress: Counties are working to redact sensitive information from online records, and courts and government agencies are doing a better job keeping personal information off the Web in the first place.

Mark Monacelli is president of the Property Rights Industry Association, a trade group that's working toward developing national standards for accessing public property records, and the recorder for St. Louis County, Minn. Mr. Monacelli says PRIA has "worked very hard with lenders and [mortgage] settlement officers to not put Social Security numbers on mortgages." He adds that "we try, to the best of our ability, to create awareness of the issue and work with counties to be aware of who's looking at your information."

At the same time, Mr. Monacelli notes that there are reasons to put information about property records online. Quick access to such information offers a slew of economic benefits. Mr. Monacelli says that when he purchased his first home, the process from looking across the lender's desk to getting the title took about 90 days – an unacceptably glacial pace now. Technology has allowed us to obtain a new mortgage or refinance very quickly; without that speed, he argues, the recent real-estate boom wouldn't have existed. "Where would this economy be without it?" he asks.

There are other standards for handling personal information, of course. This Associated Press story documents Sweden's recent clampdown on ratsit.se, a site which offered financial details for free from the country's national tax authority. If you wanted to know how much your colleague made or if your neighbor was in debt, you could. That may seem amazing to Americans, but such openness is long-established in Swedish society. Discussing his site, Ratsit's CEO told the AP's Louise Nordstrom that "a lot of people use it to negotiate their pay."
As in the U.S., it wasn't that Sweden was suddenly making documents that had been private public. Rather, it's that Ratsit did away with practical obscurity. Now, information is still available via the site, but it's no longer free: Ten requests a week cost $21. And anyone whose finances are viewed will be notified by mail and told who asked. (That new standard seems to go further than Americans might like: Imagine the chilling effects of such notification on investigative journalism or community activism.)
So what should we do?

"To me, if people want to see the records, let them go down to the courthouse -- that way you have to put forth some effort," Ms. Ostergren says, adding "I think there are too many people we have a responsibility to protect."

Robert Gellman, a Washington, D.C.-based privacy and information-policy consultant, thinks the digital era calls for states to reassess what records should be public, and what level of access should be allowed. But he defends the U.S.'s tradition of openness as a way of keeping the system honest.

"Property-tax records are available to other people for a good reason," he says, noting that if you see your house is assessed for more than your neighbor's -- or a similar house across town -- you can appeal. On the other hand, access to driver-license information is now largely limited to law-enforcement agencies and insurance companies -- the legacy of the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, whose killer obtained her personal information through the Department of Motor Vehicles.

"There should be discussions about these things, and there's no absolute right or wrong answer here," Mr. Gellman says.

Mark McCreary, a lawyer with Philadelphia's Fox Rothschild LLP who specializes in Internet law, expects a long, slow grind as sensitive information is redacted from old documents and standards emerge for keeping such information off new documents – and are adopted by local governments.

"The solution is for all the counties to do it, for all the states to do it," Mr. McCreary says, adding that "you can't take a system in place for more than 100 years and expect it to be fixed overnight."

The fix won't be simple -- it will require agreement about what personal information should and shouldn't be available, which may or may not be the same as what should and shouldn't be available online. Perhaps sensitive information will be redacted online but available in person, or perhaps sensitive information will be restricted in all forms. Those standards ought to emerge side by side with a hard look at what personal information credit-reporting agencies and marketers have access to, and what they're allowed to do with it, and efforts to make identity theft harder – and easier to recover from. And there is no technological fix for identity theft – while our fears center on distant hackers stealing our identities, those with access to our trash or our homes will always be a much bigger threat.

Popular conceptions of the Web have been shaped by science-fiction visions of the Net as a virtual-reality analogue of the world, with humanity's wealth of information organized into a gleaming cyber-city of data. But what those visions elided was all the hard work of bringing that into existence. Imagine, instead, virtual acres of rubble, with shining towers emerging from mounds of information scattered all over the place without regard to how it should be organized, labeled or kept secure. Order will emerge, but don't expect it any time soon – and don't expect the process to be painless.

Wednesday, June 20, 2007

National Settlement Services Summit

October Research Corp. kicked off the National Settlement Services Summit at the Marriott at Key Center in Cleveland with keynote speaker Harley Rouda Jr., CEO and managing partner of Real Living, offering the following:

“We have done a phenomenal job of screwing up our industry and creating bad headlines. We constantly devalue what we do day in and day out. It’s time to change our way of doing business.”

To that end, Rouda outlined 10 points of change for the industry as a whole to consider:

1. Start with the person in the mirror. Start with yourself and your firm that you’re going to take ethics and integrity in our profession to a higher level.

2. Know your fiduciary responsibilities. One of our greatest opportunities to connect with our customers is to talk about how we are like doctors and attorneys and other respected professions in that we have a higher duty and obligation to our customers.

3. Stop looking the other way. We all know what’s been going on in our industry. It is our job to stop looking the other way, to get involved and to help clean up our industry.

4. Look for red flags and report them.

5. Step out of the gray area.

6. Honesty — even if it is brutal honesty — to confront other members of our industry.

7. Transparency of information. Consumers still think it’s a great mystery in what we do. There’s got to be a way to make the transaction more transparent.

8. Push for industry change even if it hurts your bottom line. You cannot wait for the government. We are the police on the street.

9. Welcome government regulation. We don’t need more regulation, we need more accountability.

10. Take the long-term view. Think about implications beyond just the short-term. That view will cause us to make poor ethical decisions.

WSJ: Bear Stearns Funds Face Shutdown

From the Calculated Risk Blog

More from the WSJ: Two Big Funds At Bear Stearns Face Shutdown

Two big hedge funds at Bear Stearns Cos. moved toward the brink of closing down ... as a bailout plan ... fell apart ...

The funds, which once controlled more than $20 billion in a combination of investor and lender money ... had invested heavily in various securities backed by subprime loans ......

the funds had effectively paid down $2.25 billion of their $9 billion in outstanding credit. The first two lenders to exit their positions, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Bank of America Corp., agreed to unwind complicated transactions with Bear without dumping lots of bonds on the broader market. ...

By unwinding those loans in an orderly manner, rather than through a series of fire-sale auctions, Bear's fund managers ... could help stave off painful ripple effects in the broader market for mortgage-backed securities and related instruments. ...

Merrill, on the other hand ... opted to revive a planned auction for hundreds of millions of dollars worth of collateral from the Bear funds.